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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
(2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In accord with Rule 24(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Intervenor/Appellee Wheeler Machinery Company ("Wheeler") submits the following 
additional statements concerning the case which were not included in the Appellants'' Brief: 
1. The Zoning Ordinance under which Appellee Washington City ("City") granted 
Wheeler its conditional use permit makes a distinction between vacant land and land 
on which there is an existing structure. The former requires a conditional use 
approval whereas the latter is granted permitted use status. (See Washington City 
Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 24 attached in the Addendum.) 
2. Subsequent to Washington City's approval of Wheeler's conditional use permit and 
during the pendency of this appeal, Wheeler has erected and now utilizes a structure 
from which it conducts its sales and repair activities. (Washington City Certificate 
of Occupancy, attached in the Addendum.) 
3. Vehicle sales and repair is one of the uses specifically identified in the City's Zoning 
Ordinance as both a permitted and a conditional use, depending upon the presence of 
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an existing structure. (Washington City Zoning Ordinance at ^ 24-2(1 )(b) and 24-
2(2)(a).) 
4. As a private citizen and an owner of neighboring property to the Wheeler property, 
Mr. Hans Latschkowski attended the Planning Commission hearings on September 
11, 2001 and November 7, 2001 and the City Council meeting on January 9, 2002, 
and voiced his objections to the Wheeler application at all three meetings. (R.at 217, 
236-237,255.) 
5. Mr. Latschkowski was subsequently made a member of the Planning Commission and 
in that capacity he attended and voted at the Planning Commission meeting held on 
September 4, 2002, which is the subject of the present appeal. (R. at 285.) 
6. Mr. Latschkowski was one of the proposed Interveners in the Judge Beacham Case, 
No. 020500091 (identified in the Appellants5 Brief as the First Action). (R. at 180; 
See Judge Beacham Case No. 020500091) 
7. All of the proposed Intervenors in the First Action became the Appellants in the 
instant case except for Mr. Latschkowski. (R. at 1,180; See Judge Beacham Case No. 
020500091). 
8. Appellants Karen Golay, Grace Blackburn, Morgan Bingham and representatives of 
Appellants The Highlands Homeowners Association, and Turtle Creek Homeowners 
Association all registered their objection to Wheeler's application at one or both of 
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the Planning Commission meetings held in 2001 and/or at the City Council meeting 
in January of 2002. (R. at 217, 236 - 237, 255 - 256.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellants Golay, Blackburn, Blake, Christiansen et al. ("Golay, Blackburn") base 
their present appeal on the assertion that they were not provided proper notice of the 
September 4,2002 Planning Commission hearing on the matter of Wheeler's conditional use 
application. Golay, Blackburn speculate that if such notice had been given, they would have 
participated and the City "could have imposed materially different conditions on Wheeler's 
proposed use than those adopted by the Commission Decision." Golay, Blackburn's 
argument is based on the premise that although all property owners within 300 feet of the 
Wheeler property were mailed notices of the Planning Commission hearings in September 
and November of 2001, they were not given a written notice of the September 4, 2002 
Planning Commission hearing. It is the position of Wheeler that no additional written notice 
was required inasmuch as the hearing in September of 2002 before the Planning Commission 
was simply a continuation of the whole process which was started in September of 2001 and 
for which the appropriate mailings of notice were made. However, even if mailings were 
required for the September 4, 2002 meeting, it would have made no difference to Golay, 
Blackburn. The record was closed prior to the Planning Commission meeting in September 
2002 and no public input was taken nor would have been received. In addition, there was 
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no appeal of the Summary Judgment granted to Wheeler in the First Action which resulted 
in a decision requiring the City to provide Wheeler a conditional permit. Furthermore, the 
City Ordinance requiring a conditional use permit for the property at issue only applies to 
vacant land. Now that a building has been built on the land, even if the conditional permit 
were denied for any reason Wheeler could simply get a permitted use of the same through 
the Planning /Zoning Administrator without having to go through the conditional permit use 
process. Finally, had Golay, Blackburn wanted to prevent Wheeler's building from being 
built, they would have had to seek a stay or injunction and put up an appropriate bond. They 
did neither and therefore are precluded from complaining about the fact that the property is 
no longer vacant. 
ARGUMENT 
THE PLANNING COMMISSION HEARING ON SEPTEMBER 4, 2002 WAS A 
CONTINUATION OF THE PREVIOUS APPLICATION FOR A CONDITIONAL 
USE PERMIT AND THEREFORE DID NOT REQUIRE A NEW MAILING OF 
NOTICE 
The City's action relative to the final issuance of a conditional use permit was simply 
the last step in the procedure which commenced with the filing of an application for a 
conditional use permit in August of 2001. The applicable Ordinance requires that all 
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I'-rrUcants for a conditional use permit ^'ppl\ stamp* d >" I ,'ddressid I'lircinp i ill 
property owners within 300 feet of the applicant's property twenty days prior to the hearing 
on the application. ' I lie Ordinance requires the application be made on a form prepared by 
1
 • - , - ;ixis . , i ' H ' h e 
required envelopes were submitted by Wheel ; 
However, some names had been left, off of the mailing list supplied to Wheeler. I lie initial 
hearing on September 11, 2001 was therefore declared invalid because not even property 
* • * •
 ] :
 (.v, .nmu new 
envelopes for a second hearing in November, 2001 1 1 n is tl lere were acti iall> tw • : • i n z 
of the notice ^Phc commencement of the conditional use permit process on Wheeler's 
app M , a u H *. Moreover, the minutes of the Planning Commission meeting held on September 
I 1, '(KM irll'.'i, I J II'I'IIHIM nl neighbor; and olhei aim unt d nli/tiis in alluidance, including 
some ofthe Appellants. The important matter is that at lc; ' "\ the November °0() I L ii i. 
the process had met all ofthe requirements of notice. At the November 7, 2001 hearing, 
once again many members ofthe neighborhood and other members ofthe public, including 
some nl Ihe Appi lliinf' >> n r in 'illendnnee nul yaw lln II opinion 
After the denial ofthe Planning Commission by Wheeler's application, the nnri.'t ^ is 
appealed by Wheeler lo (he C\w Coinu II ^' N did i- -i require a new mailing, and none was 
made. I he matter was n< ,t* ,..<•. Hie agenda Un me C:ty Council and otherwise met the 
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other notice requirements for the holding of public meetings, and particularly City Council 
meetings. And once again many of the Appellants were in attendance. After the City 
Council decision, the matter was then appealed by Wheeler to the District Court which issued 
its ruling favorable to Wheeler. The decision to return the matter to the Planning 
Commission after the court ruling for the actual issuance of the building permit was not 
required by Judge Beacham, by City ordinances, or by Utah law. Rather, it was done as way 
of wrapping up the process. That hearing also occurred with notice being given in the typical 
way for public meetings being held in Washington City. 
In short, the action before the Planning Commission in September of 2002 was simply 
a continuation of the original application process started in September of 2001. Nothing in 
the City's ordinances requires providing additional mailings of notice after the first mailing 
for the same application. Those who were provided the initial notice had constructive notice 
of all subsequent proceedings. 
MAILED NOTICE OF THE SEPTEMBER 4, 2002 PLANNING COMMISSION 
MEETING WOULD NOT HAVE MADE ANY DIFFERENCE 
Had the notices Golay, Blackburn are claiming not to have received been mailed prior 
to the September 4, 2002 Planning Commission meeting, and even if as a result many 
citizens had attended that September 4, 2002 hearing, the results would not have been any 
different. At the outset of the meeting, the public was specifically instructed it would not 
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have the oppo 
an opportunit) lo gi\e mpa at a subsequent Lit) council meeting, had the mattci been 
appealed. The time for public input before the Planning Commission had already occurred 
.:: ••' • . . :.e manor iu;, , ,.. ;;,i.i ^.w;i. the record was closed. 
process and cannot complain that it in any way has been deprived of due process. Not only 
were there manv participants a! 1?K Planning Commission hearings in September and 
*•*•• • ; ;;.;.;.. .ci.:i^.. . .,ui;. ; .* . i iding comments 
0 } u I 1 U 1 1 1 0 ; ' ' - • I ! • | | | | I ' H N I K / S \\ li!IH"il 
were made pan of the record. Thus had written notice been sent individually to all property 
owners within 300 feet of Wheeler's property concerning the September 4, 2002 Planning 
use pen nit, the i ssi ill: w oi lldl ia\ ebeei ithe sai nebecai tsei lopi lblic ii ipi it < \ asi ecei\ eel ii i tl le 
September 4, 2002 hearing. 
Furthermore, whatever procedures were followed or not followed at the Planning 
tl le time specifier1!" auvided by City Ordinances § 8-0 
requirement is an absolute one. The claim that Golay, Blackburn did not know about the 
September 4, 2002 hearii lg and therefore did not have time in which to appeal to the City 
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Council is unavailing for a number of reasons, most of which have already been discussed. 
In addition, it should be noted that one of the citizens who lent his name to seek to overturn 
the First Action was Han Latschkowski, one of the Planning Commission members at the 
time of the Planning Commission hearing to which the objection is being raised. Although 
his name was dropped in the instant case (his being the only one dropped), it is nevertheless 
a telling point that he was working with all the current Appellants in that effort to intervene 
and he had full and actual knowledge of all matters of which Golay, Blackburn are 
complaining were hidden from them. Whatever Golay, Blackburn's reasons for not 
appealing the Planning Commission decision to the City Council, that failure cannot be based 
on Golay, Blackburn not having actual knowledge of the meeting of the Planning 
Commission and its outcome. 
THE DECISION OF JUDGE BEACHAM IS FINAL AND WAS NEVER 
APPEALED 
The First Action ended with an award of summary judgment in Wheeler's favor. On 
that basis alone, there was no need for the parties to return to the Planning Commission. 
Wheeler had sought and obtained from the court a decision which held that a conditional use 
permit should have been granted to Wheeler. That decision became final after the time for 
appeal had elapsed with no appeal filed. The First Action decision determines forever 
Wheeler's right to a conditional use permit. Thus even if the Planning Commission meeting 
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were to be held again with all of the notices claimed by Golay, Blackburn being given, and 
setting aside whether the public had the right to give input into the meeting, the trial court 
decision granting the conditional use permit remains unchanged and unchallenged. 
THE CASE IS MOOT 
Wheeler was seeking a permit for a proposed conditional use on vacant land. Once 
the permit was issued, Golay, Blackburn still had the opportunity to seek a stay or injunction 
of the permit issuing until their appeal could be decided. They did not. The land at issue is 
no longer a vacant lot. Rather, it now contains a fully constructed structure in which Wheeler 
presently carries on its activities of construction vehicle sales and repair. Pursuant to the 
terms of the relevant zoning ordinance, and as a matter of law, Wheeler's use is now a 
permitted use as opposed to a conditional use. The specific language of Zoning Ordinance 
24-2 says: 
1.) Permitted Uses. The following principal uses may be allowed in existing 
structures which have received site development plan approval and have 
obtained occupancy review and approval from the Zoning Administrator. 
* * * 
b.) Manufacturing, processing, creating, repairing, renovating, painting, cleaning 
or assembling of goods. Examples of such uses include, but are not limited to 
the following: Automobile repair shop, Bottling works, Lumberyard, Transfer 
agency, Electronic instruments assembly, and Vehicle sales and repair shop. 
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In a letter sent to Wheeler on March 30, 2001, the Planning/Zoning Administrator 
stated: "If Wheeler Machinery Company's intended use is for machinery sales, leasing, and 
repair, this type of activity is permitted under this specific zoning." (Item No. 1 of Record 
in Judge Beacham Case No. 020500091, attached in the Addendum.) The only caution was 
that because the land was then vacant, it was subject to the conditional use process. The land 
is no longer vacant and is being used precisely for the activities the Planning/Zoning 
Administrator said were permitted. As such, Golay, Blackburn no longer have a basis for 
seeking to change, modify or prevent a use that is permitted rather than conditional. Given 
that Golay, Blackburn's appeal was premised on opposition to a conditional use that Golay, 
Blackburn hoped to change, modify or prevent, their appeal is effectively rendered moot 
when that conditional use becomes a permitted use allowed as a matter of course by the 
relevant zoning ordinance. A case is deemed moot when the requested judicial relief cannot 
affect the rights of the litigants. Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989). 
Here, Golay, Blackburn's requested relief cannot affect the rights of Wheeler since the 
contested use at issue is now a permitted use as opposed to a conditional use. Golay, 
Blackburn have no basis on which to oppose, modify or reverse a permitted use. To do so 
would require this Court to rewrite or override a municipality's legislative prerogative and 
clear legislative intent. Moreover, as noted, because Golay, Blackburn never sought a stay 
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against the construction of the Wheeler building, they cannot complain of the consequences 
of its having been built. 
CONCLUSION 
Golay, Blackburn's Appeal, based on the premise of lack of input into a public 
meeting of which they claim to have had no notice must fail. They received both the notice 
prescribed by City Ordinance and actual notice. But even so, the meeting was closed to 
public comment. In any case, Judge Beacham's ruling in the First Action granting the 
conditional use stands unchallenged. Finally, their claim became moot the moment that the 
use became a permitted use. Because Appellants' appeal in its entirety has become moot, 
this Court should dismiss the appeal. 
DATED this 2 2 _ day of April, 2004. 
KESLER & RUST 
:ph C ' Rust 
atthew G. Bagley 
Attorneys for Intervenor/Appellee Wheeler 
Machinery Company 
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ADDENDUM 
13 
Washington City, Utah 
Zoning Ordinance 
Effective March 1996 
CHAPTER 24. GENERAL COMMERCIAL (C-3) ZONE27 
24-1 Purpose, 
To provide appropriate locations for the development and 
operation of general commercial activities 'where a wide range of 
retail and service activities may be established in locations 
indented to serve a regional market. 
24-2 Use Regulations. 
1) Permitted Uses. The following principal uses may 
be allowed in existing structures which have received 
site development plan approval and have obtained 
occupancy review and approval from the Zoning 
Administrator. 
a) Any permitted use listed in the AP, C-l or C-
2 zones. 
b) Manufacturing, processing, creating, 
repairing, renovating, painting, cleaning or 
assembling of goods. Examples of such uses 
include, but are not limited to the following: 
Automobile repair shop, Bottling works, Lumber 
yard, Transfer agency, Electronic instruments 
assembly, and Vehicle sales and repair shop. 
c) Auction Sales. 
d) Mail order houses, not to include 
warehousing. 
e) Accessory uses and buildings, customarily 
incidental and subordinate to an approved 
permitted use. 
f) Any combination of the above uses which meets 
all other previsions of this Ordinance. 
2) Conditional Uses. The following uses are subject 
to the conditional use approval process outlined in 
Chapter 8 of this Ordinance. 
a) The development of any vacant parcel cf land 
for any of the principal uses listed in Section 
~ This chapter was amended on April 13, 1994 by Ordinance 
No. 94-9 
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Washington City, Utah 
Zoning Ordinance 
Effective Marcn 1996 
24-2-1 (Permitted Uses). 
b) Any conditional use listed in the AP, C-l, or 
C-2 zones. 
c) Other uses that are determined by the 
Planning Commission to be compatible and in 
harmony with the intent of this zone, according to 
the designated and approved development plan. 
24-3 Site Design Regulations.' 
All site design elements for the above listed conditional use are 
subject to review and approval of the Planning Commission, who 
shall apply the standards and provisions found in Chapter 8 of 
this Ordinance, as well as the following provisions: 
1) All uses shall be free from objectionable odor, 
noise, dust, smoke, vibration or other such factors and 
2) All advertising signs shall comply with the 
provisions of Chapter 11 of this Ordinance. 
24-4 Height Regulations. 
Refer to applicable sections of the Uniform Building Code. 
24-5 Area, Width and Yard Regulations. 
Yards in Feet | 
• ! 1 District : Area in Width Front 
i Square Feet : | 
A C-3 ; None 
| i 
20 20 
Side Rear 
' • 1 
20 See modifying 
regulations 
for details ( 
24-6 Modifying Regulations. 
1) Side Yards. 
A ten (10) foot side yard shall be required where 
a side yard abuts an agricultural or residential zones. 
Side yards abutting a street require a twenty (20) foot 
side yard. 
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Washington City, Utah 
I}rung Ordnance 
Effective Marcn .996 
2) Rear Yards, 
A ten (10) foot rear yard open and accessible for 
emergency access will be required where a rear yard 
abuts a residential or agricultural zone. 
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Certificate of Occupancy 
Washington City 
(Department of (Building Inspection 
This certificate issued pursuant to the requirements of Section R 110.1 the 
Uniform Building Code certifying that at the time of issuance this structure 
was in compliance with the various ordinances of the city regulating building 
construction or> use. For the following: 
Use Classification Commercial ButUlne BuMng Permit No. $M6 
Group R3-U1 ; Type Construction VB Use Zone C3 
Chm*r of Building Wetter Maimer* Address 908 Worth SeafoodRoad 
Building Address 203 North Plava Delta Route Locality Buena Vista 
/ " BuildJi Budding 0 
By: Joseph C Mavnes 
Date: Job 30.2003 
<Ikri&CfoV£ 
surca 
C\TY VASTER 
On T*lAS!.f»EH 
^sfdjytm.Xltni 847SO 
• <&X[42£)Z5tr£$7Q 
March 30, 2001 
Mansell & Associates 
Arm: Chris Qiapinatt, $ales Eiecutrvfc • 
St George, Utah 
Re: Parcel in Washington (Tax-IDfe;W-BV-3-307^-I 
To Whom It May .Concern, 
Jt is understood that^ntr clieniv"WheelerMachin&ry.Cc., is»j» liie process ofpirrohrisinga3.S 
2cre parcel of vacant land owned by.£LC Eqiiitib^C^'BV-S-S^-^-l'), which* is located between 
Cactus Lane and Playa Delia RxisitaoiLBuena: Vista BcuWard- %&t ^ B&renced parcel has^Oo 
Commercial Zoning.1 Jf Wheeled.Madfi]jsry.£ciinpany5s ini^dtdjisc^'ibrmadmery s^les, ., 
[easing, and repair, tilts type of-abtivfey is permitted under this spedfi&rohmg. 
PI case be reminded, however, of Section 24-1, 2a/qf(the ^ ffffifig&il City Zoning Qtdinance, 
which states in parp that "the development of any parcel of ^ca^l^ndjfei.any-of tiieall'o^abie 
uses must go through the Conditional Use ^pro^.tin3cesstraiEiied& Chapter 8 for this 
ordinance," 
I hope that the infditnation prqvined above will assiej you&nd ydurclftnt in cch&ltfding your real 
estate transactions 
Respectfully* . 
Creig'Maynes s. 
P tanning/Zoning, Adm^strctor 
Chief Building ©fSeiai 
cc: Neil Biggs, Ssles Execnuyc 
Wardley, CMAC Red Estate 
